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INTRODUCTION 
or a long time, democracy was a non-issue in international law. In 
1986, the International Court of Justice declared: 
However the regime in Nicaragua be defined, adherence by a State to 
any particular doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary  
international law; to hold otherwise would make nonsense of the fun-
damental principle of State sovereignty, on which the whole of interna-
tional law rests, and the freedom of choice of the political, social,  
economic and cultural system of a State.1 
This perspective changed dramatically in the 1990s following the end of 
the ideological dichotomy of the Cold War. A new interventionist U.N. 
Security Council and a large number of newly emerging democracies in 
Latin America, Africa, and Asia led to a widespread euphoria about de-
mocracy. In response, Francis Fukuyama predicted the “end of history,”2 
and legal scholars started discussing an emerging right to democratic 
governance.3 
The first major international document addressing this issue was the 
Vienna Declaration of the World Conference on Human Rights (“Vienna 
Declaration”), which recognized that “[d]emocracy, development and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent 
and mutually reinforcing.”4 The Vienna Declaration not only promotes 
democracy as a form of government, but also emphasizes the beneficial 
impact of democracy on development.5 This statement runs against the 
traditional assumption of modernization theory6 that the stability of a 
democracy depends on a State’s level of socio-economic development.7 
It promotes democracy as a universal cure for poverty and assumes that 
democracy can be established at almost any stage in the developmental 
process and in any society. 
                                                                                                             
 1. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 123 (June 27). 
 2. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN xii (1992). 
 3. See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International 
Law, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 539 (1992); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Demo-
cratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46 (1992). 
 4. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) [hereinafter Vien-
na Declaration]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. For an account of modernization theory, see infra Part I.B.2. 
 7. Adrian Leftwich, Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World, 
14 THIRD WORLD Q. 605, 605 (1993). 
F 
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The purpose of this Article is to examine these underlying assumptions 
and to reconsider democratic entitlement theory in light of democratiza-
tion theory in order to redefine the claim to democracy by making a more 
modest proposal. Instead of finding evidence supporting the emergence 
of an unequivocal right to democratic governance, the practices of re-
gional bodies and treaty obligations suggest the existence of a principle 
of democratic teleology, according to which States are obligated to de-
velop towards democracy. Part I of the Article sets forth an analytical 
framework that clarifies the definition of democracy and assesses the 
principal approaches conceptualizing democratization processes. It will 
show that there is much uncertainty within the social sciences on what 
constitutes an ideal path to democracy. There is consensus that democra-
cy cannot be introduced overnight, but is, rather, a complex and long-
term process. Part II addresses approaches to democratic entitlement and 
proposes a more differentiated approach that focuses on the process of 
democratization rather than the existence of democratic governance. The 
subsequent analysis will show that there is no right to democratic gover-
nance in international law. Instead, States have an obligation to develop 
towards democracy. 
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Section A of this portion of the Article establishes a working definition 
of democracy. After locating two intertwined aspects to the concept—a 
binary classification and a gradation—this section argues that the defini-
tion of “democracy” should be grounded in the former and should be 
minimalist: democracy can be said to exist when a government has been 
chosen through periodic and contested elections. In contrast, the gradual 
dimension of the concept takes into account normative components to 
democracy. These two dimensions will be the basis for the analysis that 
follows on democracy in international law. 
Section B further develops the theoretical framework of this Article by 
critically evaluating three major theories of democratization: cultural 
prerequisites theory, modernization theory, and social homogeneity 
theory. We will see that democratization is too multifaceted and complex 
to be fully captured in any one theory. As various internal as well as ex-
ternal factors interdependently influence democratization, it is difficult to 
predict precisely what facilitates transitions to democracy. Instead, de-
mocratization, as demonstrated in this Article, is a complex process, 
which can take different forms and shapes. 
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A. Definition of Democracy 
Democracy is a contested concept. Although it seems to be “nonnego-
tiable” in the Western Hemisphere,8 there remains little consensus on 
what “democracy” actually means.9 Scholars flesh out the term with dif-
ferent content. Some propose “thin” or “minimalist” models of democra-
cy,10 while others advocate “thick” or demanding conceptions.11 The 
search for a definition of democracy is complicated by the fact that there 
is disagreement on whether democracy is a question of kind or one of 
degree.12 The former interpretation is a simple binary one—a political 
system is either a democracy or not. The latter, in contrast, is gradual—
democracy is a question of degree. Both conceptions, however, are com-
plementary and not mutually exclusive. Conceiving democracy in a gradual 
way presupposes that an anterior classification has been made because it 
would deprive the concept of every heuristic value to qualify authorita-
rian or totalitarian regimes as democratic to a certain degree.13 Once a 
binary classification has been made, it may be valuable to distinguish differ-
ent types of democracy on a gradual scale, as long as democracy is not 
solely perceived to be an ideal concept. The notion of democracy, thus, 
has two dimensions: a binary classification, which differentiates between 
democracies and nondemocracies, and a graduation, which distinguishes 
between democracies of different quality. 
Regarding the binary approach, there are two ways to address the issue 
of defining democracy. On the one hand, one can look at whether rele-
vant sources either explicitly or implicitly provide a definition. On the 
other hand, one can establish a proper definition of democracy and ana-
lyze whether such a concept exists in international law, notwithstanding 
whether it is actually called democracy. Although, at first glance, the first 
approach seems to be appealing, its application is deceptive. The term 
                                                                                                             
 8. IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 1 (2003). 
 9. LAURENCE WHITEHEAD, DEMOCRATIZATION: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE 14 (2002). 
 10. See, e.g., Adam Przeworski, Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense, in 
DEMOCRACY’S VALUE 23, 23 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999). 
 11. See Susan Marks, Human Rights, Democracy and Ideology, in 8 COLLECTED 
COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW, BOOK 2: THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN EUROPE 51 (Acad. of Eur. Law ed., 1997). 
 12. GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED 184 (1987). 
 13. Id. at 184–85. See also Armin von Bogdandy, Demokratisch, demokratischer, am 
demokratischsten? Zur Steigerungsfähigkeit eines Verfassungsprinzips am Beispiel einer 
Neugestaltung der Verordnungsgebung [Democratic, More Democratic, the Most Demo-
cratic? On the Gradual Character of a Constitutional Principle Based on the Example of 
a Reform of Executive Regulations], in VERFASSUNG—PHILOSOPHIE—KIRCHE. FEST-
SCHRIFT FÜR ALEXANDER HOLLERBACH ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 364, 367 (Joachim Bohnert 
et al. eds., 2001) (F.R.G.). 
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“democracy” is used very rarely in international legal documents—
perhaps precisely because of its vagueness. Where it can be found, its 
meaning is unspecified.14 The aforementioned Vienna Declaration15 and 
the U.N. Secretary General’s Agenda for Peace, for example,16 only al-
lude to democracy’s positive effects on human rights, development, and 
peace. International human rights instruments reference notions of dem-
ocratic society in savings clauses, yet fail to elucidate the meaning of the 
word.17 
There is one prominent exception, however. In 2000, the U.N. General 
Assembly adopted a resolution entitled “Promoting and Consolidating 
Democracy.”18 According to the resolution, democracy consists of a 
number of different elements: the promotion of pluralism, the protection 
of human rights, a separation of powers, the rule of law, elections, the 
development of civil society, good governance, sustainable development, 
solidarity, and social cohesion.19 Nonetheless, this appears to be more of 
a wish list than an attempt to propose a coherent definition of democracy. 
It mingles substantive and procedural issues without saying anything 
about their interrelation. In addition, the resolution fails to distinguish 
between the institutional framework of government and certain pro-
grammatic issues, such as sustainable development or social cohesion.20 
Turning to political science literature, several definitions of democracy 
can be found. Some are minimalist, focusing primarily on elections,21 
while others incorporate additional elements, for example, the rule of 
                                                                                                             
 14. But cf. STEVEN WHEATLEY, DEMOCRACY, MINORITIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
128–34 (2005) (noting that democracy is defined by international legal documents as a 
political system in which power is based on the will of the people). However, the concept 
of the will of the people is as abstract as the concept of democracy, making Wheatley’s 
definition just as unspecific. 
 15. Vienna Declaration, supra note 4. 
 16. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on an Agenda for Peace, 
Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, U.N. Doc. S/24111, A/47/277 
(June 17, 1992). 
 17. See American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica” arts. 
15, 16(2), 22(3), 32(2), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144 [hereinafter American Con-
vention]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 14(1), 21, 22(2), Dec. 
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 6(1), 8(2), 9(2), 10(2), 11(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
 18. G.A. Res. 55/96, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/96 (Dec. 4, 2000). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See SARTORI, supra note 12, at 90 (explaining this distinction). 
 21. Przeworski, supra note 10. 
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law,22 the preservation of civil and political rights,23 minority protec-
tion,24 or the existence of social rights.25 Defining democracy is such a 
difficult task because the debates on what democracy is and what democ-
racy should be are often intermingled.26 As its definition is highly con-
tested and malleable at its borders,27 this analysis will concentrate on the 
core of democracy: the legitimation of public power through elections. A 
political system may be deemed a democracy when its government is 
designated through periodic and contested elections.28 Elections are con-
tested when their outcomes are uncertain ex ante and irreversible ex 
post.29 
This definition is meant to be purely descriptive, not normative. It does 
not ignore that there are good reasons for more demanding concepts of 
democracy. However, because the implementation of the rule of law or 
the protection of human rights, for example, are separate institutions, 
distinguishable from the establishment of democracy, they should be 
subject to independent analyses.30 It is possible to imagine an autocratic 
regime observing the rule of law or complying with human rights obliga-
tions. An autocracy in which the government is appointed through con-
tested elections, however, is a contradictio in adjecto. 
As previously mentioned, democracy also has a second, qualitative 
dimension. Recently, Susan Marks cautioned against adopting a mini-
malist concept of democracy in international law.31 If States have 
                                                                                                             
 22. See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy, Globalization and Europe: How to Square De-
mocracy, Globalization, and International Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 885, 889–90 (2004). 
 23. ROBERT ALAN DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 3 (1971) (in-
cluding freedom of expression, information, and association, as well as an inclusive status 
of citizenship in his definition of democracy). 
 24. Steven Wheatley, Democracy in International Law: A European Perspective, 51 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 225, 247 (2002). 
 25. See generally DAVID BEETHAM, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1999) (advo-
cating a democracy theory based on social rights). 
 26. In particular, theorists proposing a “thick” concept of democracy often take an 
idealist position, allowing their vision of an ideal political system to influence their defi-
nition of democracy. 
 27. WHITEHEAD, supra note 9, at 15. 
 28. See ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-BEING IN THE WORLD, 1950–1990 at 14–18 (2000) (proposing 
this definition). 
 29. Id. at 16. 
 30. Manfred G. Schmidt, Ist die Demokratie wirklich die beste Staatsverfassung? [Is 
Democracy Really the Best Form of Government?], 28 ÖSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT 187, 191–92 (1999) (Austria). 
 31. Susan Marks, The “Emerging Norm”: Conceptualizing “Democratic Governance,” 
91 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 372, 373 (1997); Marks, supra note 11, at 78–88. 
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reached a certain minimum threshold, they would become immune from 
further critique, which is an undesirable consequence, given the tendency 
in international relations to idealize democracy.32 Marks, therefore, proposes 
a gradual definition of democracy.33 Nevertheless gradual conceptualiza-
tions are not a substitute for classificatory ones. Instead of incorporating 
normative concerns into the definition of democracy itself, this Article 
addresses this critique by including a gradual dimension in the concept of 
democracy, supplementing the proposed binary definition, which centers 
upon the role of elections. 
B. Theories of Democratization 
The transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic system is 
not simply a shift in political status, but a social process influenced by 
various external factors. When the debate on democratization started in 
the late 1950s, it addressed the issue by analyzing the “prerequisites of 
democracy.”34 In its strict sense, the term suggests that democracy has 
certain requirements, without which democracy is unable to function. 
Still today, there are authors who promote such a strict approach and argue 
that certain cultural environments are hostile to democracy. The majority 
of scholars, however, pursue a more moderate approach. They try to 
identify socio-economic factors that may be favorable to the establish-
ment of democracy. The earliest and most influential school is that of 
modernization theory, which seeks to establish a correlation between 
economic development and democracy. Other scholars inquire into the 
relationship between ethnic, social, or religious homogeneity and the 
prospects for democracy. 
1. Cultural Prerequisites 
The theory of cultural prerequisites argues that the establishment of 
democracy depends on the cultural environment of a State. Samuel Hun-
tington, the most prominent proponent of this theory, divides the world 
into eight major civilizations: Japanese, Latin American, Western, Afri-
can, Buddhist, Orthodox, Confucian, and Islamic.35 Among these, only 
the first three cultures are regarded as favorable for democracy. Confu-
                                                                                                             
 32. Marks, supra note 11, at 81–82. 
 33. Id. at 87. 
 34. See Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SC. REV. 69 (1959) [hereinafter Lip-
set, Some Social Requisites]. 
 35. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 25–26 
(1993). 
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cian and Islamic civilizations are seen as hostile to democracy, while the 
remaining three are viewed as neutral.36 There is some empirical evi-
dence supporting Huntington’s thesis,37 but his argument is unconvincing. 
Experience shows that Confucianism and Islam are not per se inimical to 
democracy.38 Although a lack of separation between belief systems and 
politics may present an obstacle to the establishment of a democratic so-
ciety, such fluidity is not particular to Confucianism or Islam, but rather 
an expression of socio-economic progression.39 Religious or cultural pat-
terns are subject to change during the course of social development.40 An 
example in this respect is the development of Catholic societies. Although 
Catholicism was regarded as a major obstacle to democratization a few 
decades ago,41 many states with predominantly Catholic populations have 
since developed into stable democracies. Therefore, religion or culture is 
not an absolute impediment to, but at most a surmountable difficulty in, 
the process of democratization. 
However, the question of the cultural prerequisites of democracy is not 
purely empirical. It also has a normative dimension. If the preconditions 
for democratization are established in a certain society, these necessarily 
                                                                                                             
 36. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 300 (1991). 
 37. According to the IMF, Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Qatar, Singa-
pore, and the United Arab Emirates are among the thirty most developed States based on 
their per capita incomes of more than 20,000 USD. These States, which could be classi-
fied under Huntington’s political and cultural taxonomy as Confucian or Islamic, do not 
qualify as electoral democracies according to Freedom House’s Annual Global Survey of 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Compare INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC 
OUTLOOK DATABASE (Apr. 2007), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/data/ 
index.aspx (providing GDP data for 2004), with FREEDOM HOUSE, SELECTED DATA FROM 
FREEDOM HOUSE’S ANNUAL GLOBAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
(2007), http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_release/fiw07_charts.pdf. 
 38. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, as well as Indonesia can be considered electoral 
democracies. The first three countries are influenced by Confucianism, while Indonesia is 
home to the largest Muslim population in the world. 
 39. Pippa Norris & Ronald Inglehart, Islamic Culture and Democracy: Testing the 
“Clash of Civilizations” Thesis, 1 COMP. SOC. 235, 239–41 (2002). 
 40. WOLFGANG MERKEL & HANS-JÜRGEN PUHLE, VON DER DIKTATUR ZUR DEMOKRA-
TIE: TRANSFORMATIONEN, ERFOLGSBEDINGUNGEN, ENTWICKLUNGSPFADE [FROM DICTA-
TORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY: TRANSFORMATIONS, CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS, TRAJECTORIES] 
40 (1999) (F.R.G.); Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Prerequisites of Democracy Re-
visited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 7 (1994) [hereinafter Lipset, Democracy Revisited]. 
 41. Cf., e.g., Kenneth A. Bollen, Political Democracy and the Timing of Develop-
ment, 44 AM. SOC’Y REV. 572, 584 (1979) (noting support for the view that “the greater 
the extent to which a culture is Protestant-based, the greater the level of political democ-
racy”); Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec, in CANADIAN 
DUALISM 241, 245 (Mason Wade & Jean-C. Falardeau eds., 1960). 
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lead to cultural changes. From a normative perspective, this raises some 
problems. In the 1990s, some Asian governmental leaders, such as Ma-
laysia’s former Prime Minister, Mahathir bin Mohamed, and Singapore’s 
former Head of State, Lee Kuan Yew, engaged in a debate on Asian val-
ues. They argued that Western democracy should not be imposed on 
Asian societies because it conflicts with certain Asian traditions. While 
Western democracy is a system of rights, according to these leaders, 
Asian societies perceive political communities to be embedded in a sys-
tem of obligations and emphasize community-oriented values.42 
Significant weight, however, should not be afforded to the assertion 
that cultural values exempt a State from pursuing democracy. Politicians 
may be strategically seeking to preserve the status quo from which they 
benefit. Moreover, making appeals to culture-based exceptions assumes 
an authority to define a given set of values.43 Furthermore, cultural rela-
tivism fails to answer the question of who determines the composition of 
the group whose cultural tradition shall be relevant. It is not imperative 
to take the collectivity of citizens as the point of reference because a 
population can be very heterogeneous.44 If the argument referring to 
Asian values is not of a purely strategical nature, its main purpose is to 
reinforce collective values.45 As long as we understand democracy as a 
procedural framework, though, the concept has sufficient flexibility to 
realize a wide range of different value systems. Consequently, cultural 
diversity does not per se discredit the universal promotion of democratic 
rules. 
2. Modernization Theory and its Modifications 
Modernization theory attempts to establish a relationship between the 
development of a State and its degree of democratization.46 In 1959, 
Martin Seymour Lipset made the groundbreaking claim that “the more 
well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democra-
                                                                                                             
 42. Diane Mauzy, The Human Rights and “Asian Values” Debate in Southeast Asia: 
Trying to Clarify the Key Issues, 10 PAC. REV. 210, 215 (1997). 
 43. WOLFGANG MERKEL, DEMOKRATIE IN ASIEN. EIN KONTINENT ZWISCHEN DIKTATUR 
UND DEMOKRATIE [DEMOCRACY IN ASIA. A CONTINENT BETWEEN DICTATORSHIP AND 
DEMOCRACY] 91 (2003) (F.R.G.). 
 44. Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 488–89 (1989). 
 45. Jürgen Habermas, Remarks on Legitimation Through Human Rights, in THE 
POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS, 113, 124–25 (Max Pensky ed. & 
trans., Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2001). 
 46. See Larry Diamond, Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered, in 
REEXAMINING DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET 93, 93 (Gary 
Marks & Larry Diamond eds., 1992); Lipset, Some Social Requisites, supra note 34. 
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cy.”47 Lipset argued that economic development leads to higher levels of 
urbanization48 and education,49 and to the establishment of a middle class 
with increased socio-economic mobility. This mobility deprives the un-
derclass of its revolutionary potential and thus supports the stability of a 
democratic system.50 Political elites are also less likely to be disadvan-
taged during periods of governmental change because the relative effect 
of a policy change is stronger in poorer countries. 51 
Since the publication of Lipset’s theory, several empirical studies have 
confirmed a correlation between economic development and democrati-
zation, showing that higher economic prosperity increases the probability 
that a State will have a stable democratic system.52 However, there is no 
causal relationship between both factors.53 Economic development is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient precondition for democracy. There 
are important examples that disprove a determinist relationship. India, 
for example, has been a relatively stable democracy for several decades 
notwithstanding its per capita GDP, which has remained below 1000 
USD.54 In contrast, several Arab States with higher per capita incomes 
have yet to develop democratic structures. Furthermore, data suggests 
that economic development is not the principle cause for transitions to 
democracy. Economic prosperity merely stabilizes democratic institu-
tions once they have developed.55 Poor democracies also face a high 
probability of collapsing; only after reaching a certain stage of develop-
ment are democracies sufficiently stable to survive economic crises.56 
However, economic development is not the only factor that influences 
the democratization process. All political systems have informal rules and 
                                                                                                             
 47. Lipset, Some Social Requisites, supra note 34, at 75. 
 48. Id. at 78. 
 49. Id. at 78–82; Seymour Martin Lipset, et al., A Comparative Analysis of the Social 
Requisites of Democracy, 45 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 155, 167 (1993). 
 50. Lipset, Some Social Requisites, supra note 34, at 83. 
 51. Id. at 84. 
 52. PHILIP COULTER, SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1975); Ken-
neth A. Bollen & Robert W. Jackman, Economic and Noneconomic Determinants of 
Political Democracy in the 1960s, 1 RES. POL. SOC. 27, 42 (1985); Diamond, supra note 
46, at 93–96; Lipset, et al., supra note 49. 
 53. MANFRED G. SCHMIDT, DEMOKRATIETHEORIEN [DEMOCRACY THEORIES] 441 
(2000) (F.R.G.); MERKEL & PUHLE, supra note 40, at 33; Bruce J. Bueno de Mesquita & 
George W. Downs, Development and Democracy, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 77 (2005) (noting 
that China’s tremendous economic growth has not yielded democratic development). 
 54. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 37. 
 55. Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Modernization: Theories and Facts, 49 
WORLD POL. 155, 166 (1997). 
 56. Id. at 169–70. 
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arrangements that support political processes.57 While such mechanisms 
may ideally complement formal constitutional institutions and increase 
their flexibility, informal networks can be used to pervert democratic 
rules if the democratic system is unstable or defective.58 This involves 
political actors strengthening their power by relying on exclusive net-
works outside of constitutional institutions. Such defective democracies 
are thus likely to breakdown in social or economic crises or to transform 
into open autocracies. 
How do defective democracies differ from functional ones? Tatu Van-
hanen suggests a rational approach, positing a relationship between the 
degree of democratization and the degree to which social power re-
sources are distributed.59 If power resources are widely dispersed, it is 
difficult for a specific group within a society to oppress other social 
groups by establishing and maintaining hegemonic structures.60 The de-
gree of distribution is related to other socio-economic factors, including 
economic development and level of education.61 Vanhanen’s approach 
thus supplements rather than modifies modernization theory. 
Charles Tilly offers another decisive factor, state institutional capaci-
ty.62 According to Tilly, strong civil and political institutions increase the 
prospects for a successful democratization process, as these institutions 
can offset one of the most significant obstacles to this process, “auto-
nomous power centers.”63 Of course, there are limits: if a State is too 
strong, political actors have incentives to claim exclusive power and un-
dermine democratization. Thus, informal “trust networks” have to be 
integrated into the public political space.64 While power dispersion con-
tinues to serve an important function, it must take place within state insti-
tutions, rather than in opposition to them. 
                                                                                                             
 57. CHARLES TILLY, DEMOCRACY 88 (2007) (analysing how the establishment of trust 
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Turning to cultural scholarship, commentators have argued that demo-
cratization depends on citizens and political elites internalizing similar 
understandings of democratic values.65 Certainly, democratic values are 
not embraced over night. These values must be learned, accumulated, 
and assimilated as social capital.66 Forming them requires education and 
experience with democratic institutions.67 Furthermore, socio-economic 
change may lead to a transformation of political values.68 
In summary, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, the function-
ing and stability of democracy depend on several interdependent factors: 
socio-economic development, the diffusion of power resources, stable 
civil and political institutions, and a democratic culture. Accordingly, 
democratization rarely takes place abruptly: it is usually a gradual 
process.69 
3. Cultural and Ethnic Homogeneity 
The debate on cultural, religious, and ethnic homogeneity as a precon-
dition for a stable democracy dates back to John Stuart Mill, according to 
whom: 
Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of differ-
ent nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if 
they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion ne-
cessary to the working of representative government cannot exist.70 
As belonging to a particular cultural, religious, or ethnic group heavily 
influences identity, in many pluralistic societies, voting often follows 
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social affiliations.71 It is thus barely surprising that empirical studies sug-
gest that the probability of establishing democracy in homogeneous so-
cieties is twice as high as in segmented societies.72 
Scholars have proposed various remedies to overcome problems asso-
ciated with diverse societies. The most widely recognized proposal is 
Arend Lijphart’s model of consociational democracy.73 Lijphart seeks to 
describe a system in which every major social group is represented, iden-
tifying four fundamental characteristics: government created by “grand 
coalition”; mutual veto rights to protect minority interests; proportional 
representation in politics and civil service, as well as proportional distri-
bution of public funds; and a federal structure that gives each social 
group significant autonomy.74 
However, consociationalism implicitly assumes that human identity is 
unalterable. Identity is not an inherent characteristic of human beings, 
but a social construct.75 Although identity is not infinitely alterable, it can 
change with time and circumstance.76 Research in social psychology also 
shows that the interaction among different social groups can enhance the 
possibility of forming a common superordinate identity.77 Consociational-
ist models thus run the risk of deepening rather than overcoming divisions 
in society. This does not mean, though, that democracy is impossible in 
pluralistic societies. One solution is to put in place voting procedures that 
discourage incentives to vote according to cultural, religious, or ethnic 
cleavages.78 
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Nevertheless, attempts to unify through incentive-based voting me-
chanisms carry certain risks. Without a consensus on the fundamental 
rules of the political game, they cannot surmount social divisions.79 The 
remedy in these circumstances is to promote socio-economic develop-
ment. States with highly segmented societies often have weak institu-
tional structures.80 Thus, formal institutions have to be strengthened, and 
trust in these institutions must be developed, while a common identity is 
concurrently established. Consequently, in the ideal case, nation- and 
capacity-building precede the transition to democracy.81 
4. Conclusions 
The different theories explaining democratization present a complex 
picture. The approaches are not mutually exclusive, but rather highlight 
different aspects of the process of democratization. Transition to and 
consolidation of democracy are dependent on a variety of factors, defy-
ing monocausal explanations.82 Therefore, democracy has no necessary 
or sufficient prerequisites, meaning that neither low levels of economic 
development nor significant cultural, religious, or ethnic heterogeneity 
preclude the establishment of a relatively stable democracy.83 Converse-
ly, significant economic prosperity or social homogeneity do not lead to 
an automatic transition to democracy. 
Despite the lack of causal explanations, there still remain significant 
correlations between economic development and social cohesion, and 
democratization. Low economic development or weak social homogeneity 
can endanger the consolidation of democracy. These obstacles are malle-
able,84 but they are subject to long-term processes that are not necessarily 
steady.85 As a result, sometimes it may be more effective to compromise 
short-term successes in order to pursue long-term goals.86 Furthermore, 
in certain circumstances, it may be advisable to engage in nation- and 
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identity-building before fostering the establishment of institutions. Be-
cause there is no universally valid formula for success, many political 
scientists stress the unpredictable character of democratization, describ-
ing it as a “complex, long-term, dynamic and open-ended process.”87 
Although elections are typically a step in the overall process, they are 
not necessarily the first step.88 Democratization is thus a teleological 
process,89 and its final objective is the establishment of a legitimate form 
of government. This process, though, does not necessarily have to be 
democratic itself.90 
II. DEMOCRATIC TELEOLOGY IN POSITIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Given the process-like character of democratization, Part II of this  
Article examines how this understanding of democracy is reflected in 
positive international law, while paying particular attention to how our 
working definition of democracy, which centers upon the role of elec-
tions, is represented in institutional and regional practice. Towards this 
end, this section critically reviews two approaches to identifying custo-
mary norms: deductive and inductive. The first relies on an interpretative 
methodology in identifying customary norms.91 According to this ap-
proach, some scholars try to deduce customary norms from more abstract 
principles. Based on the assumption that the legal system is holistic and 
without internal contradictions, a rule must be considered customary law 
if it follows necessarily from a more general principle that has already 
been accepted.92 Section A considers the attempts of some scholars to 
employ this interpretative approach in order to deduce a right to demo-
cratic governance from the principle of self-determination. 
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According to the inductive approach, customary norms are identified 
by inducing them from state practice and opinio juris.93 In Section B, we 
will thus analyze the relevant international practice on democracy, such 
as different U.N. resolutions, regional mechanisms designed to preserve 
democracy, and the reactions of the international community to coups 
against elected regimes. This analysis will show that international law 
does not contain a right to democratic governance. Instead, it will identi-
fy a principle of democratic teleology, that is, States are legally obliged 
to develop towards democracy. 
A. Self-Determination 
Scholars have used the deductive approach in an attempt to derive a right 
to democratic governance from the principle of self-determination.94 There 
are two strands to this argument, one contextual and the other logical. 
This Section argues that both fall short. Although there is a textual rela-
tionship between democracy and self-determination within the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR” or “Covenant”), 
it does not translate into a customary principle of self-determination. The 
logical argument fails because it does not take into account the difference 
between establishing a political system and the content of the political 
system itself. Instead, this Section proposes that self-determination only 
requires a government to be representative, not democratic. 
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1. Democracy as Mandatory Consequence of Self-Determination 
Originally, self-determination had a primarily external direction, its 
strongest impact occurring in the context of decolonization.95 However, 
through its incorporation into Common Article 1 of the ICCPR and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,96 it also 
gained an internal dimension.97 According to this provision, the principle 
of self-determination grants every people, inter alia, the right to determine 
their political status freely. The U.N. General Assembly soon after af-
firmed this interpretation in its Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations (“Friendly Relations Declaration”).98 
Two main arguments attempt to deduce a democratic principle from 
the right to self-determination. The first argument is contextual and in-
terprets Article 1 of the ICCPR99 in the context of the Covenant’s other 
provisions, in particular in conjunction with the right to democratic elec-
tions, as prescribed in Article 25.100 According to this argument, the right 
to participate in elections informs how the right to determine political 
status is exercised.101 However, it seems more convincing to interpret 
Articles 1 and 25 in a way that affords them independent normative 
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scope.102 If the guarantees of self-determination, as shaped by Article 25 
of the ICCPR, do not exceed the right to democratic elections, then the 
linkage is unnecessary. In order to ensure elections, Article 25 offers a 
sufficient normative basis. If one wants to draw further conclusions, a 
mere connection between and abstraction from essentially independent 
principles is not enough. If we interpret, for instance, the customary prin-
ciple of self-determination outside the ICCPR’s framework and in light 
of Article 25, then the scope of the electoral guarantee would extend im-
permissibly beyond the limits of the Covenant. 
The second argument is more fundamental. Instead of focusing on the 
normative context, it seeks to establish a logical relationship between 
self-determination and democracy. The right to choose a political system 
belongs to the people, not their government. It has been argued that this 
decision must be effectuated through democratic mechanisms, as nonde-
mocratic means are not attributable to a people.103 However, this “logical” 
relationship is based on a problematic premise.104 It fails to distinguish 
between the act of creating a political system, and the actual content and 
structure of government, namely, the pouvoir constituant and the pouvoir 
constitué.105 The right to self-determination involves the former, but not 
necessarily the latter. History provides several examples where citizens 
opted through electoral means to delegate power to political elites who 
then established authoritarian rule.106 
One solution to this dilemma is to distinguish formally between the act 
of establishing a political system and the political system itself. The par-
ticipation of citizens is limited to the former. If they choose a system 
other than democracy, they have, by this act, exhausted their right to self-
determination.107 However, this view cannot explain why the act of self-
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determination should be irreversible. Electoral outcomes depend on spe-
cific historical circumstances, and these circumstances may change over 
time, just as citizens’ preferences or the very composition of a population 
itself. Therefore, it is difficult to justify why the citizenry of one histori-
cal moment should have the power to bind future generations. 
Gregory Fox and Georg Nolte set forth another solution in their contri-
bution on “intolerant democracies.”108 Addressing whether democracies 
should be allowed to fight political tendencies directed against the sys-
tem itself, they propose a substantive concept of democracy. According 
to their concept, electoral results may be disregarded in order to prevent 
an undemocratic opposition from coming to power, thereby protecting 
democracy as such. This argument, though, exhibits a predisposition to-
wards democracy.109 Democracy, or even a specific type of substantive 
democracy, is considered to be an absolute value a priori. It has been 
shown, however, that the value of democracy always depends on socio-
economic circumstances.110 Thus, Alberto Asor Rosa’s statement is quite 
astute: 
[D]emocracy, precisely because it is a system of mediocrity that cannot 
make itself out to be an absolute or an end in itself . . . is a game whose 
defining feature is that it allows its own rules to be called into question. 
If it does not, it is already something else.111 
2. Representation and Self-Determination 
Nevertheless, this observation does not lead to the conclusion that the 
right to self-determination does not impose any restrictions on the power 
of political elites to choose a form of government. With regard to the 
principle of self-determination, the United Nations stated in its Friendly 
Relations Declaration: 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing 
or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or 
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in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and inde-
pendent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above 
and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people be-
longing to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.112 
Consequently, not every form of government is compatible with self-
determination. To conform, a government must be representative. A fur-
ther argument supports this observation. If a government could exclusively 
determine the content of self-determination, then the principle of self-
determination would not differ from the principle of state sovereignty 
and thus lose any independent value.113 
However, representation does not necessarily have to be realized 
through elections. It may be realized by a government acting in the public 
interest, functioning as a government for the people. In this circums-
tance, the problem is determining what form of government should be 
recognized as representative. Unlike democracy, representativeness can-
not be determined by the sole existence of certain institutions. Offering  
a helpful, substantive proposal, Georg Sørensen distinguishes among 
development-oriented regimes, growth-oriented regimes, and self-enriching 
regimes.114 While development-oriented regimes strive to promote eco-
nomic development as well as individual well-being, growth-oriented 
regimes focus on fostering economic growth without taking into account 
its effects on society.115 Of the three, self-enriching regimes are incom-
patible with the right to self-determination. A second indicator of a  
representative government is its human rights record. Not every human 
rights violation renders a government illegitimate, as such violations occur 
even in the most advanced political systems.116 However, where syste-
matic violations of core human rights take place within its borders, a 
State is not representative of its citizens. It is illegitimate and, as a result, 
infringes upon the right of its population to self-determination. 
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B. International Practice: Establishing Democratic Teleology 
The inductive approach relies on the practice of international institu-
tions.117 This Section examines the approach to democracy in internation-
al law through the lens of democratization theory. It argues that interna-
tional law does not contain a strict right to democratic governance, but 
rather a principle of democratic teleology. This principle has two dimen-
sions.118 States are not required to transition to democracy right away, 
but rather, must to develop towards democracy. Similarly, they are also 
obligated to prevent regressions in the process of democratization.119 
Evidence supporting these two dimensions can be found in various 
fields of international law. The following analysis concentrates on three 
areas of especial importance. First it focuses on universal human rights 
instruments and the practice of international institutions, including the 
U.N. General Assembly. This appraisal reveals that the relevant docu-
ments predominantly employ process-oriented language that focuses on 
democratization instead of democracy. Moreover, the practices of regional 
bodies in the Americas, Europe, and Africa will be considered.120 Instead 
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 118. See Schedler, supra note 89, at 98. 
 119. Id. 
 120. The following analysis omits a detailed account on Asia. This is due to the fact 
that commitments to democracy are at best embryonic. Nevertheless, some positive 
trends can be observed in the framework of the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(“ASEAN”). Democracy is first mentioned in the ASEAN’s Vientiane Action Program 
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of dealing with positive progress, these bodies focus on enforcement me-
chanisms meant to prevent setbacks once democracy has been intro-
duced. The Section concludes by looking at military interventions in the 
name of democracy. Implicitly condemning the ousting of elected heads 
of state, these interventions also emphasize the need to prevent setbacks 
in the process of democratization. 
1. International Institutions 
(a) Right to Democratic Elections Under the ICCPR 
Universal treaties are a well-recognized indicator for the existence of 
customary norms. When States enter into treaty obligations, they express 
their intent to be bound by its norms and thus manifest a corresponding 
opinio juris.121 The most important treaty norm in this context is Article 
25 of the ICCPR. It ensures the right to genuine, periodic elections, 
which thereby guarantees the free expression of the electorate’s will.122 
Although socialist States originally argued—based on the travaux prépa-
ratoire—that one-party systems could conform to Article 25, there is 
now consensus among international legal scholars that voters must have 
a more “meaningful choice” in order for a State to meet the Covenant’s 
requirements.123 A “free expression of the will of the electors”124 and 
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tion. Vientiane Action Program Title II (1), Nov. 29, 2004, available at http://www. 
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(2003); Richard Burchill, Regional Integration and the Promotion and Protection of De-
mocracy and Human Rights in Asia: Lessons from ASEAN (Working, Paper), http://law. 
nus.edu.sg/aslasi/workingpapers/2007/doc/Mr%ØRichard%20Burchill.pdf (last visited Oct. 
20, 2008). 
 121. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 20). For 
additional commentary on the issue of treaties as indicators of customary law, see gener-
ally Richard R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES COURS 25 (1970). 
 122. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 25. 
 123. SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY ¶ 22.31 (2d ed. 2004); Gregory H. Fox, 
The Right to Political Participation in International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 48, 57–59 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000); Karl 
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tection, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. ¶ 3, available at http://www.mpepil. 
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“[participation] in the conduct of public affairs”125 are only possible 
when voters have a choice between not only different persons, but also 
different political agendas.126 
Thus far, 160 States have ratified the ICCPR.127 More than eighty per-
cent of the international community has agreed to select their governments 
through free and fair elections. However, there are notable exceptions. 
China and Pakistan, two of the ten most populous States in the world, 
have failed to ratify the ICCPR.128 Furthermore, the list of abstaining 
countries shows patterns of regional concentration. Especially in East and 
Southeast Asia,129 a considerable number of States have not committed 
themselves to holding periodic elections. Moreover, the number of States 
parties becomes less impressive when actual state practice is considered. 
Many of the States that have ratified the ICCPR do not actually practice 
electoral democracy. According to a 2007 survey of Freedom House, 
only two-thirds of the signatory States qualify as electoral democracies.130 
Mere commitment to Article 25 without accompanying state practice is 
insufficient to establish a customary principle of democracy.131 
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(b) Declarations of the U.N. General Assembly 
The U.N. General Assembly has put forth a more modest approach. 
Since 1988, it has been issuing resolutions in a series entitled “Enhancing 
the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections.”132 
The first resolution does not contain an explicit affirmation of a right to 
democratic elections. Instead, in the resolution, the General Assembly 
2. [s]tresses its conviction that periodic and genuine elections are a ne-
cessary and indispensable element of sustained efforts to protect the 
rights and interests of the governed and that, as a matter of practical 
experience, the right of everyone to take part in the government of his 
or her country is a crucial factor in the effective enjoyment by all of a 
wide range of other human rights and fundamental freedoms, including 
political, economic, social, and cultural rights; 
3. [d]eclares that determining the will of the people requires an elector-
al process which accommodates distinct alternatives, and this process 
should provide an equal opportunity for all citizens to become candi-
dates and put forward their political views, individually and in co-
operation with others.133 
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Instead of imposing a strict obligation, the resolution stresses the impor-
tance of elections. Paragraph 2 emphasizes that elections are a necessary 
precondition for output legitimacy, while also invoking an empirical jus-
tification.134 In contrast, Paragraph 3 is of a normative nature, referring to 
the “will of the people” and highlighting the necessity of implementing 
their will through an electoral process.135 
This resolution was slightly amended in following years. The succes-
sive versions contain reservations underlining the autonomy of States to 
develop their own political systems. Adopted in 1991, Resolution 
46/137, for example, 
[r]ecogniz[es] that there is no single political system or electoral method 
that is equally suited to all nations and their people and that the efforts 
of the international community to enhance the effectiveness of the prin-
ciple of periodic and genuine elections should not call into question 
each State’s sovereign right, in accordance with the will of its people, 
freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural 
systems, whether or not they conform to the preferences of other 
States.136 
Furthermore, in the operative part, this Resolution 
[u]nderscores the duty of each Member State, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to respect the decisions 
taken by other States, in accordance with the will of their people, in 
freely choosing and developing their electoral institutions.137 
Concurrently, in 1989 the General Assembly adopted a counter-
resolution series, “Respect for the Principles of National Sovereignty and 
Non-interference in the Internal Affairs of States in their Electoral 
Processes,”138 which stresses the right of peoples to determine their polit-
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ical, economic, and social systems. In this Resolution, the General As-
sembly 
1. [r]eiterates that, by virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, 
all peoples have the right, freely and without external interference, to 
determine their political status and to pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development, and that every State has the duty to respect that 
right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter; 
2. Affirms that it is the concern solely of peoples to determine methods 
and to establish institutions regarding the electoral process, as well as 
to determine the ways for its implementation according to their consti-
tution and national legislation; 
[. . .] 
4. Urges all States to respect the principle of non-interference in the in-
ternal affairs of States and the sovereign right of peoples to determine 
their political, economic and social system.139 
At first glance, the two strands in these series appear to contradict each 
other.140 While one praises the advantages of an electoral system of gov-
ernment, the other emphasizes the importance of national autonomy as 
well as a people’s authority to choose a proper political, economic, and 
social system without external interference. However, any seeming con-
tradiction is not as great as some scholars maintain. Even if a people 
have the right to determine their political system, the choice is not unli-
mited. As discussed in the previous section, a legitimate government 
must be representative.141 Paragraph 5 of Resolution 46/137 expresses 
this point by emphasizing that the choice has to be made “in accordance 
with the will of the people.”142 Considering the difficulties of consolidat-
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ing the pouvoir constituant and pouvoir constitué,143 though, this right to 
choose does not amount to an automatic right to democracy. 
The resolutions, rather, suggest a teleological view of elections and 
democracy, upholding the desirability of electoral institutions without 
imposing a strict obligation to establish and honor them. In the above 
analysis of democratization theories, it has been shown that democratiza-
tion is a long-term process, not a simple shift from one status to another.144 
By using the terms “developing” and “enhancing” to discuss electoral 
institutions, the language of these resolutions stresses this process-like 
character of democratization. 
In addition, several other resolutions and declarations of the interna-
tional community support this understanding of democratization. A 
prime example is General Assembly Resolution 55/96, which was 
adopted in 2000.145 Its central purpose is to “call upon states to promote 
and consolidate democracy.”146 Thus, the Resolution also uses process-
oriented terminology by employing the words “promoting” and “consoli-
dating.” The latter is often used in the social sciences to describe the te-
leological nature of democratization processes.147 Similarly, the term 
“consolidation” bolsters the point that in international law democracy is 
both a classificatory and a gradual concept. Democratization not only 
involves the process leading to a transition to democracy, but also re-
quires subsequent consolidation. 
The aforementioned Vienna Declaration of Human Rights also in-
cludes a paragraph dedicated to democratization: 
The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms that least developed 
countries committed to the process of democratization and economic 
reforms, many of which are in Africa, should be supported by the inter-
national community in order to succeed in their transition to democracy 
and economic development.148 
Again, the language focuses on the process of realizing rather than the 
status of democracy. Finally, in the U.N. Millennium Declaration, one 
can find two statements championing the promotion of democracy or 
advocating the development of U.N. Member States’ capacity for demo-
cratization.149 
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2. Regional Developments 
(a) The Americas 
Some of the most extensive guarantees concerning democracy can be 
found in the context of the Organization of American States (“OAS”). 
Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights150 prescribes 
the right to participate in democratic elections. Furthermore, according to 
Article 2(b) of the OAS Charter,151 the promotion of democracy is one of 
the Organization’s principal objectives. At the start of the 1990s, the 
OAS established a mechanism to implement this objective. In June 1991, 
the General Assembly of the OAS adopted Resolution 1080, which au-
thorized the OAS Permanent Council to employ coercive measures 
against a Member State whose democracy was compromised.152 
One year later, the Washington Protocol modified the founding char-
ter.153 Revised Article 9 of the Charter provides for suspending a State’s 
membership rights if its elected government has been overthrown by 
force. The mechanism governing this suspension is now outlined in 
greater detail in Articles 17 through 22 in the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter,154 which was adopted in 2001.155 
The OAS has applied this sanction mechanism several times. In Sep-
tember 1991, shortly after the adoption of Resolution 1080, it was first 
employed in response to Haiti’s president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, being 
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ousted in a coup. The OAS Permanent Council convened immediately 
and condemned the coup, demanding that Aristide be reinstated.156 Three 
days later, the OAS suspended trade relations with Haiti and all forms of 
non-humanitarian aid.157 Subsequently, the United Nations assumed the 
case, and two years after the coup, it finally authorized the United States 
to intervene militarily to force the military junta to step down.158 
In April 1992, the President of Peru, Alberto Fujimori, staged an auto-
coup, in which he dissolved the parliament and arrested several opposi-
tion members.159 The OAS Permanent Council expressly condemned this 
action,160 and the international community suspended loans to Peru. The 
international pressure prompted Fujimori to concede the election of a 
constitutional assembly in November 1992.161 Nevertheless, the effec-
tiveness of these international measures was limited, as in the end Fujimori 
won the elections and maintained power.162 
One year later, Guatemala’s president, Serrano Elías, also initiated an 
auto-coup, dissolving the parliament, suspending several constitutional 
rights, and dismissing the constitutional court.163 In this case, the OAS 
initiated sanctions severer than those used against Fujimori.164 The Per-
manent Council unanimously condemned Serrano’s coup and ultimately 
forced him to step down.165 
Peru again became the focus of international attention in 2000 when 
the OAS sent a mission to Peru to monitor presidential elections.166 The 
monitoring mission found itself unable to guarantee the technical mini-
mum standards for counting the votes in the decisive ballot between  
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Fujimori and his contender, Alejandro Toledo.167 The OAS thus can-
celled the mission.168 In its report, the delegation stated that the elections 
failed to meet international standards.169 Despite this report, OAS Mem-
ber States could not agree to condemn Peru on the basis of Resolution 
1080.170 The Permanent Council, adopting a compromise, sent a mission 
to Peru to investigate the situation in more detail.171 The mission, however, 
was not completed because Fujimori stumbled into a corruption scandal 
and had to cede power.172 
In February 2004, Haiti’s President Aristide was toppled for a second 
time.173 Following brief hostilities, Aristide was forced to step down and 
flee the country.174 The president of the supreme court, Boniface Alexan-
dre, succeeded Aristide as transitional president.175 The reaction of the 
international community was much more lukewarm compared to thirteen 
years earlier. Although the OAS General Assembly reacted four months 
later, adopting a resolution that called upon Haiti to return to democracy 
and condemned the acts of violence since the coup,176 the OAS failed to 
authorize formal sanctions or suspend Haiti’s membership rights.177 Most 
probably, this mild international reaction was due to Aristide’s weak  
legitimacy, considering he won elections in 2000 that were subject to 
irregularities.178 Furthermore, many human rights organizations blamed 
Aristide for the deteriorating human rights situation and political vi-
olence in the country.179 This case suggests that the OAS treats coups 
d’état differently. Rather than automatically condemning every coup, the 
OAS considers the perceived legitimacy of an ousted head of state to be 
a decisive factor. 
References to democracy are not limited to the OAS. Legal documents 
addressing democracy and elections can also be found in the framework 
                                                                                                             
 167. Fujimori Insists Poll ‘Fair,’ BBC NEWS, May 30, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/americas/768893.stm. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Toledo Withdraws from Peru Election, BBC NEWS, May 22, 2000, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/americas/759691.stm. 
 170. OAS Mission for Peru, supra note 166. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Michele Wucker, Haiti: So Many Missteps, 21 WORLD POL’Y J. 41, 41–42 (2004). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. David S. Berry, Non-Democratic Transitions: Reactions of the OAS and CARICOM 
to Aristide’s Departure, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 249, 256 (2005). 
 176. O.A.S. Doc. AG/RES. 2058 (XXXIV-O/04) (June 8, 2004). 
 177. Berry, supra note 175. 
 178. Wucker, supra note 172, at 41, 45. 
 179. Id. at 47. 
64 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:1 
of some Latin American regional organizations. In 1998, the Member 
States of the Andean Community (“CAN”) adopted the Andean Commu-
nity Commitment to Democracy180 as a legally binding additional protocol 
to the founding statute of the CAN, the Cartagena Agreement.181 In addi-
tion to expressing a commitment to democracy in Article 1, the protocol 
sets up a sanction mechanism in Article 4.182 If the democratic order is 
disrupted in violation of Article 2, this mechanism provides for coercive 
measures ranging from the suspension of membership rights to ineligibil-
ity for loans from the financial institutions of the CAN.183 Furthermore, 
Article 13 of the Human Rights Charter of the CAN prescribes a right to 
democracy, which is further specified in Articles 14 through 18.184 
A similar mechanism was included in the framework of the Mercado 
Común del Sur (“MERCOSUR”). In 1996, the Member States adopted a 
declaration on democracy stating that the establishment and maintenance 
of democratic institutions are fundamental preconditions for cooperation 
with the MERCOSUR.185 Violations may lead to the suspension of 
membership rights.186 With the Protocol of Ushuaia, this mechanism has 
been transformed into an international treaty, applying to Bolivia and 
Chile in addition to the member signatories.187 
Article 3 of the Protocol of Tegucigalpa, the founding statute of the 
System of Central American Integration (“SICA”),188 identifies the pro-
motion and strengthening of democracy as one of the organization’s 
principal objectives.189 In 1995, this objective was reaffirmed in the 
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Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America.190 In ad-
dition to noting that the SICA is based on the principles of democracy 
and the rule of law, Article 1 of the Treaty obligates States to elect gov-
ernments through universal and free elections.191 
(b) Europe 
As in the Americas, the institutional design of European international 
organizations shows a strong commitment to democracy. Article 3 of the 
first additional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights192 
prescribes a right to participate in democratic elections. In contrast to the 
OAS, however, the principle of democracy has not been enshrined in the 
founding Statute of the Council of Europe (“Statute”).193 Rather, Article 
3 of the Statute provides that Member States “must accept the principles 
of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdic-
tion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincere-
ly and effectively in the realisation of the objective of the Council as 
specified in Chapter I.”194 Although missing in the operative part of the 
Statute, democracy is mentioned in the preamble. There, democracy is 
described as originating from the “spiritual and moral values which are 
the common heritage of the [European] peoples.”195 According to Article 
1(a) of the Statute, fulfilling these values is one of the main objectives of 
the Council.196 
In practice, a State’s level of democratization has had an influence on 
its membership in the Council of Europe. When the parliamentary de-
mocracy in Greece was succeeded by a military dictatorship in 1967, the 
European Council’s Parliamentary Assembly recommended the exclusion 
of Greece to the Committee of Ministers.197 Greece responded by with-
drawing from the Council of Europe on December 12, 1969.198 Similarly, 
the Council only admitted Portugal and Spain as members after each 
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country reinstated democratic governments.199 And after the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, Russia’s admission to the Council was delayed for 
several years because, inter alia, a report of experts testified that Russia 
had failed to meet “the Council of Europe’s standards.”200 
In the Charter of Paris, enacted during the Conference for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe in 1990, European heads of state declared that 
democracy is the only admissible form of government.201 Although the 
Charter of Paris does not have immediate binding force, consistent with 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,202 it can be 
used as a tool to interpret existing obligations such as those of the Coun-
cil of Europe.203 
The supranational institution in which the democracy principle is the 
most developed, but also the most widely criticized, is the European Un-
ion.204 According to Article 6(1) of the Treaty on the European Union, 
democracy is one of the EU’s fundamental principles.205 It is part of the 
acquis communautaire, which every potential member must observe in 
order to be admitted to the European Union.206 Moreover, Article 7 of the 
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Treaty provides for a sanction mechanism whereby certain membership 
rights may be suspended if Article 6(1) of the Treaty is violated.207 
(c) Africa 
Regarding the African Union (“AU”), Article 13 of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“Banjul Charter”) does not explicitly  
mention a right to elections. 208 It does, however, guarantee a right to par-
ticipate in public affairs.209 According to the African Commission on 
Human Rights (“African Commission”), this participation involves legi-
timating a sovereign power through elections.210 Articles 3(g) and 4(m) of 
the AU Charter also identify the promotion of and respect for democratic 
principles and institutions as fundamental objectives of the AU.211 More-
over, the AU as well as its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity 
(“OAU”), have established protection mechanisms against coups d’état. 
The starting point was a 1994 resolution of the African Commission, 
which condemned military overthrows of government and appealed to 
military regimes to transfer their power to elected governments.212 
In practice, the turning point was the ousting of Ahmed Kabbah in 
Sierra Leone in 1997.213 The OAU supported the military intervention of 
the Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”)214 and 
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called upon the international community not to recognize the junta of 
Paul Koroma.215 The OAU reacted similarly towards military coups in 
the Comoros, Ivory Coast, and Niger, refusing to acknowledge the legi-
timacy of rebel governments in these states.216 
This position was translated into a formal legal rule during the founda-
tion of the AU. Article 4 of the AU Charter condemns unconstitutional 
changes of government.217 Correspondingly, Article 30 of the AU Char-
ter allows a State’s membership rights to be suspended where the gov-
ernment has come to power by “unconstitutional means.”218 Reading  
Article 4 in conjunction with Article 30 suggests that the latter permits 
such sanctions only when an elected regime has been ousted. 
In a 2000 declaration (“Declaration”), AU Member States further ela-
borated upon this sanction mechanism.219 The Declaration provides for a 
six-month period in which the implicated State has the opportunity to 
restore its constitutional order, and during this time, the AU can suspend 
its right to participate in the policy-making organs of the AU.220 If it does 
not comply with this obligation, the AU may then institute sanctions 
against the noncompliant State.221 The Declaration contains a nonexhaus-
tive list of possible sanctions, ranging from denying visas for illegitimate 
government officials, to limiting government-to-government contacts, to 
restricting trade with other AU countries.222 
This mechanism has been applied in several cases. In 2003, the AU 
barred the Central African Republic from taking part in its organs after 
military forces overthrew the elected president, Ange-Félix Patassé.223 
The AU allowed the country to resume its participation following presi-
dential elections held in 2005.224 Likewise, when Faure Gnassingbé cap-
tured power in Togo by military force after the death of his father in  
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February 2005, in addition to condemning the coup and welcoming the 
sanctions that ECOWAS initiated, the AU suspended Togo’s member-
ship rights.225 This pressure prompted Gnassingbé to step down and hold 
elections, which he ultimately won.226 Despite doubts about the legitimacy 
of Gnassingbé’s election,227 the Peace and Security Council readmitted 
Togo’s government.228 
This last example indicates that the current practice of the AU is prob-
lematic in two respects: on the one hand, its sanctions are too far-
reaching, and on the other hand, as in the case of Togo, they are not  
inclusive enough.229 Regarding the over-inclusiveness of sanctions, mili-
tary coups have been condemned, notwithstanding the legitimacy of 
ousted regimes. There is thus a danger that the mechanism is a reinforcer 
of the status quo rather than a catalyst for democratization.230 Maurita-
nia’s President, Maaouya Sid Ahmed Ould Taya, for example, whose 
legitimacy was questionable at best, was overthrown in a bloodless coup 
in August 2005.231 Although the military government announced that it 
would hold elections within two years and exclude its own participation, 
the AU condemned the coup and subjected Mauritania to sanctions.232 
However, some African politicians voiced dissent. The South African 
Ambassador to Mauritania, for example, declared: “[although] the prin-
ciple of the AU is not to agree with coups . . . we believe we shall not 
have one policy to fit every situation.”233 The sanctions against Maurita-
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nia were nonetheless lifted only after presidential elections were held in 
the spring of 2007.234 
However, there are also positive signs. In two other cases, the AU  
issued formal condemnations without further sanctions in response to 
coups against regimes of doubtful legitimacy. The December 1999 mili-
tary coup against a corrupt regime in the Ivory Coast was publicly criti-
cized, but the transitional government was recognized shortly thereafter.235 
When President Kumba Yalla was ousted in Guinea-Bissau in 2003, after 
dissolving the parliament and adopting several dictatorial decrees, the 
AU only denounced the coup.236 
At the same time, the AU has been very reluctant to act when it comes 
to other constitutional infringements such as falsifying elections, amend-
ing constitutions to consolidate more power, or permitting additional 
terms in office.237 A recent example is the March 2008 presidential elec-
tion in Zimbabwe. Although the legitimacy of the reelection of Robert 
Mugabe was questionable at best, the AU General Assembly only 
adopted a resolution encouraging the opposing parties to enter into a 
constructive dialogue and failed to impose any sanctions.238 
Some regional organizations in Africa have established mechanisms 
similar to those of the AU. The 1991 Declaration of Political Principles 
of the Economic Community of West African States asserts: 
We believe in the liberty of the individual and in his inalienable right to 
participate by means of free and democratic processes in the framing of 
the society in which he lives. We will therefore strive to encourage and 
promote in each of our countries, political pluralism and those repre-
sentative institutions and guarantees for personal safety and freedom 
under the law that are our common heritage.239 
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The essence of this declaration was incorporated into the 1993 Treaty 
of ECOWAS.240 Subsections (h) and (j) of Article 4 provide that the right 
to participate in the conduct of government and promote democracy is 
one of the organization’s fundamental principles.241 Moreover, in accor-
dance with Article 58(2)(g), the organization is to offer its support in the 
holding of elections upon a Member State’s request.242 The ECOWAS 
reaffirmed these principles in the Protocol on Democracy and Good Go-
vernance,243 which explicitly emphasizes the obligation to hold free, fair, 
and transparent elections.244 
Furthermore, in Article 4(c) of the Charter of the South African Devel-
opment Community (“SADC”), the promotion of democracy is enshrined 
as one of the SADC’s guiding principles.245 According to Article 5(1), 
the organization’s objectives feature, inter alia, the promotion of com-
mon political values “transmitted through institutions which are demo-
cratic, legitimate and effective,”246 as well as the “consolida[tion], de-
fen[se] and mainten[ance] of democracy.”247 The SADC Principles and 
Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, adopted in August 2004 
during the organization’s summit in Mauritius, also support these prin-
ciples.248 
(d) Evaluation 
The analysis of emerging regional commitments to democracy presents 
a heterogeneous picture. In the Americas and Europe, a democracy prin-
ciple has been established under regional customary law.249 Both human 
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rights treaties and documents of the regional political organizations con-
tain extensive electoral and democratic guarantees. American and Euro-
pean regional bodies have also developed effective sanction mechanisms 
against States that fail to meet democratic standards. In Europe especially, 
these sanctions not only concentrate on the central element of democra-
cy—elections—but also strive to implement a more substantive vision of 
democracy. 
With regard to Africa, locating a coherent democratic principle is more 
difficult. Although the AU Charter has deemed democracy one of its vital 
objectives,250 and the Banjul Charter prescribes a right to participate in 
public affairs,251 many governments in Africa remain undemocratic. 
However, instead of actively promoting democracy, the established sanc-
tion mechanisms exclusively address regressions in the process of demo-
cratization, which supports the argument that the democracy principle 
must be read in a teleological manner rather than in a strict sense. 
3. Democracy and the Use of Force 
Military intervention in the name of democracy has attracted the most 
attention in the literature on democracy in international law. The follow-
ing analysis focuses on five possible precedents for the use of force to 
promote democracy. In doing so, this section compares the unilateral 
military interventions of the United States in Grenada, Panama, and Iraq 
with the U.N. Security Council-backed interventions in Haiti and Sierra 
Leone. 
(a) Unilateral Interventions in Grenada, Panama, and Iraq 
In response to a coup d’état against the government of Maurice Bishop, 
U.S. troops invaded Grenada on October 25, 1983, with the support of 
neighboring Caribbean States.252 Three days after the invasion, the U.S. 
military succeeded in overthrowing the military council, which had come 
to power after the coup.253 In the ensuing debate among legal scholars on 
the legality of the U.S. intervention, some argued that restoring democra-
cy was a sufficient legal justification.254 However, there are several facts 
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that undercut this position. First, Bishop himself attained power not by 
democratic means, but through a coup d’état in 1979.255 Second, the U.S. 
administration did not attempt to justify the intervention on the grounds 
of restoring democratic order.256 The opinions of academic commentators 
alone are insufficient for an opinio juris.257 Finally, and most importantly, 
the U.N. General Assembly condemned the intervention as illegal by an 
overwhelming majority.258 While resolutions of the General Assembly 
are certainly not directly binding, they are an expression of opinio juris 
that the U.S. invasion cannot be regarded as a precedent for a right to 
pro-democratic intervention.259 
The U.S. offensive in Panama is a second possible precedent for the 
idea that democracy may justify military intervention.260 On December 
20, 1989, the U.S. army invaded Panama in order to overthrow the re-
gime of Manuel Noriega and capture the head of state himself. This time, 
President George H.W. Bush explicitly justified the action on the basis of 
protecting democracy, in addition to citing the need to protect U.S. citi-
zens, combat drug trafficking, and secure implementation of the Panama 
Canal treaties.261 However, the U.N. General Assembly again condemned 
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the intervention by a clear majority.262 Therefore, the intervention in Pa-
nama should likewise not serve as evidence of a right to democracy in 
international law.263 
The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 is the most recent case in 
which regime change was invoked as a justification for war.264 In his 
State of the Union address on January 28, 2003, President George W. 
Bush declared: “And tonight I have a message for the brave and op-
pressed people of Iraq: Your enemy is not surrounding your country—
your enemy is ruling your country. And the day he and his regime are 
removed from power will be the day of your liberation.”265 Among the 
political considerations that finally led to the war, Iraq’s democratization 
was a major factor.266 It is telling, though, that in official legal justifica-
tions for the war, neither the United States nor Great Britain mentioned 
regime change as the principle reason.267 Instead, they justified the inter-
vention by interpreting Resolutions 678,268 687,269 and 1441270 of the 
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U.N. Security Council respectively.271 Nonetheless, a considerable part 
of the international community condemned the intervention. Among its 
opponents were Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, and Rus-
sia.272 Accordingly, the Iraq War also cannot be regarded as support for 
the emergence of an international democracy principle.273 
(b) Collective Interventions in Haiti and Sierra Leone 
In the search for precedents that ground such a norm, collective inter-
ventions authorized by international institutions are more promising indi-
cators than the unilateral interventions examined thus far. Many legal 
scholars argue that the 1991 intervention in Haiti, which was authorized 
by the U.N. Security Council, serves as a paradigmatic precedent.274 In 
1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected as Haiti’s president with sixty-
seven percent of the votes.275 The United Nations276 and the OAS277  
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monitored this election at Haiti’s request. On September 29, 1991, the 
military overthrew Aristide.278 Though not responding immediately, in 
June 1993, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 841, which 
imposed economic sanctions on Haiti.279 As a result, Haiti’s military re-
gime concluded the so-called Governors Islands Agreement, in which it 
conceded the reinstatement of Aristide to power.280 However, the imple-
mentation of the Agreement failed when members of the junta exercised 
force against Aristide partisans in the autumn of 1993. In response, the 
Security Council set up a naval blockade281 and continued the economic 
sanctions.282 On July 31, 1994, it adopted Resolution 940, which permitted 
all U.N. Member States to use force to reinstall the legitimate govern-
ment in Haiti.283 On September 18, 1994, just hours before a multination-
al troop under U.S. leadership was scheduled to land in Haiti, former 
U.S. President Jimmy Carter, with the support of Senator Sam Nunn and 
General Colin Powell, convinced the junta to cede power to Aristide and 
leave the country.284 
Several authors have refused to recognize this case as setting a 
precedent for collective pro-democratic intervention, arguing that 
through its actions, the Security Council was primarily addressing the 
protection of peace and security in the region.285 The response of the 
United Nations, however, should be examined within the context of the 
Security Council’s new activism during the 1990s. In a series of resolu-
tions, the body broadly interpreted the notion of peace and security in 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The Security Council held that peace 
and security do not simply mean the absence of the use of military force. 
According to the Council, these two terms may be invoked in the case of 
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internal crises, such as those in Rwanda and Somalia.286 While formally 
respecting the text of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council, with over-
whelming support from the legal literature,287 expanded its authority to 
cope with the new world order that emerged after the end of the Cold 
War. Thus, despite the reference to peace and security in the region, 
Resolution 940 was clearly focused on restoring internal order in Haiti.288 
Moreover, some scholars have doubted the competence of the U.N. 
Security Council to intervene for the purpose of reinstating democratic 
order,289 while others have argued that the case of Haiti cannot be gene-
ralized because of the specific regional context.290 Some commentators 
have even maintained that the general human rights situation in Haiti291 
or the violation of the Governors Islands Agreement justified the Securi-
ty Council resolution.292 However, these objections cannot account for 
the fact that the restoration of democracy was the explicit objective of 
Resolution 940. This objective is expressed in its preamble: 
“[r]eaffirming that the goal of the international community remains the 
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restoration of democracy in Haiti and the prompt return of the legitimate-
ly elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, within the framework of the 
Governors Island Agreement.”293 Also, supporting the legitimate gov-
ernment of Haiti plays an important role in its operative part: 
1. [The Security Council welcomes] the report of the Secretary-General 
of 15 July 1994 (S/1994/828) and takes note of his support for action 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in order to  
assist the legitimate Government of Haiti in the maintenance of public 
order; 
[…] 
4. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, [the 
Security Council] authorizes Member States to form a multinational 
force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use 
all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military 
leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the 
prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration 
of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to estab-
lish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit im-
plementation of the Governors Island Agreement, on the understanding 
that the cost of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by 
the participating Member States . . . .294 
Although the preamble also refers to the human rights situation in Hai-
ti,295 human rights violations are not the focus of the operative part of the 
Resolution, as it concentrates on re-establishing the legitimate order.296 
Furthermore, the reference to the Governors Islands Agreement itself is 
inessential. It is implausible that the Security Council would have im-
plemented an agreement between a de facto regime and a de jure gov-
ernment irrespective of the latter’s content. The Governors Islands 
Agreement was only implemented because the goals of the Agreement 
were to restore democratic order to the country. Finally, with regard to 
the competence of the Security Council, normative concerns are irrele-
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vant when examining practice and opinio juris concerning democracy.297 
The crucial point here is that the Security Council Resolution is an indi-
cator of the international community’s reception of the intervention. 
Nevertheless, the scope of the Haiti precedent is limited.298 The inter-
vention addressed the restoration of a disrupted, preexisting constitution-
al order. It cannot be regarded, therefore, as an indicator of a universal 
democracy principle. However, it does fit into the patterns already ob-
served in the context of General Assembly resolutions. If the democracy 
principle in international law is teleological and process-oriented, then 
countries are indeed not obliged to turn into democracies overnight. 
Teleology, though, prohibits setbacks in the process of democratization. 
If collective interventions, such as the intervention in Haiti, occur after 
coups d’état against elected governments, this practice confirms the prin-
ciple of democratic teleology. 
The intervention of Nigeria and ECOWAS in Sierra Leone further 
supports this argument. In Sierra Leone, a country plagued by civil war, 
the parties to the conflict signed peace accords following the 1996 presi-
dential elections.299 In these elections, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was voted 
president.300 As the Rebel Unity Front were militarily weak and lost the 
elections, it signed the Abidjan Accord in November 1996, in which the 
parties consented to an immediate ceasefire and the disarmament of the 
combatants.301 This agreement did not, however, contribute to a détente. 
On the contrary, on May 25, 1997, the President of Sierra Leone was 
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overthrown.302 This prompted Nigerian troops of the ECOWAS Monitor-
ing Group (“ECOMOG”) to intervene. In June 1997, Nigerian forces 
invaded Sierra Leone and helped to reinstate Kabbah as president in 
March 1998. The U.N. Security Council only retroactively approved the 
intervention. In October 1997, it expressed support for the ECOWAS 
action,303 and on March 16, 1998, it welcomed President Kabbah’s return 
to office.304 
The legal scholarship identifies several justifications for the ECOMOG 
intervention, including pro-democratic intervention,305 humanitarian in-
tervention,306 and invitation by the de jure government.307 Some authors 
have raised doubts concerning the democratic intentions of the interven-
ing States, noting that Nigeria, the leader of the intervention, was itself 
ruled by an autocratic government.308 However, in evaluating the inter-
vention as a precedent for the emergence of a democracy principle, the 
reception of the international community is more significant than the in-
tentions of the intervening parties or the legality of the intervention itself. 
The Security Council resolutions on Sierra Leone stress the importance 
of restoring democratic order. Resolution 1132 requests the military junta 
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to reinstate democratic order,309 while Resolution 1156 welcomes the 
country’s return to democracy.310 Therefore, the case of Sierra Leone, 
confirms the patterns already observed with regard to Haiti. The interna-
tional community views the overthrow of an elected government as a 
violation of international law,311 and this supports the existence of a prin-
ciple of democratic teleology in international law. 
4. Resume 
International law does not provide for a strict right to democratic  
governance, as international documents and corresponding practice em-
phasize the process-oriented character of democratization. Democracy, 
rather, is perceived as a teleological principle, according to which States 
and societies are obliged to develop towards democracy. This principle 
has two dimensions. First, it is directed against regressions in the process 
of democratization. Obvious setbacks are military coups. This is under-
lined by the practice of the U.N. Security Council, which endorsed military 
action after elected governments were overthrown in Haiti and Sierra 
Leone and by the sanction mechanisms of the OAS and the AU. 
Regressions, though, are not limited to coups d’état. They also encom-
pass other setbacks in the process towards and consolidation of democra-
cy, such as increased centralization of power by heads of state or the  
cession of political control to the military. Examples include the 1992 
autogolpe of Alberto Fujimori in Peru and the 1995 “constitutional refe-
rendum” of Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus.312 In particular, this is 
reflected in the sanctioning practice of the OAS and, to a certain extent, 
in that of the AU. Both organizations have the power to impose sanctions 
not only for military coups, but also for other efforts to erode democracy. 
Regional institutions have shown reluctance to act in cases where formal 
elections have been held, but election results have been falsified by un-
due influence. In theory, such cases should constitute setbacks in the 
process of democratization, which run counter to the principle of demo-
cratic teleology. 
Democratic teleology is not merely concerned with avoiding setbacks 
and regressions. It also imposes a second obligation whereby States must 
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actively develop towards democracy and then consolidate democratic 
institutions. As an ideal type of democracy as well as an ideal method of 
democratization are lacking, this duty does not require specific perfor-
mance. Governments have a certain margin of flexibility, and only clearly 
defective strategies can be regarded as illegal. In order to assess strate-
gies, the same classification proposed in the context of the principle of 
self-determination may be used.313 According to this proposal, regimes 
that are not self-enriching and that observe core human rights principles 
should be considered legal and legitimate. 
CONCLUSION 
Nearly two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the euphoria sur-
rounding democracy has cooled down considerably. Democracy is not 
the cure-all it was widely considered to be. Moreover, the third wave of 
democratization in the early 1990s314 was much weaker in the end than 
many observers had predicted. Although there is near consensus in phi-
losophy and political sciences that, in the long run, there can be no suita-
ble alternative to democracy as a form of government, democratization is 
not a simple change of the political status. Instead, it is a long-term, 
complex, social process, and its preconditions are still very much debated 
in social science research. 
This contribution attempts to address these concerns by framing de-
mocracy as a teleological principle. In international law, democracy is 
neither an absolute right nor a strict obligation. The identified norm, ra-
ther, focuses on the process-like character of democratization. States are 
merely obliged to develop towards democracy. This understanding of the 
democratic principle in international law better comports with existing 
legal documents, which use process-oriented rather than prescriptive lan-
guage. What constitutes concrete development in the process of democra-
tization is, to a considerable extent, subject to a State’s own discretion. 
Due to the binary character of legal norms, though, lawyers prefer 
clear standards. Karl-Heinz Ladeur once offered a metaphor where he 
compared the law to a blind man who uses “a stick to test the stability of 
the ground on which he walks.”315 Throughout this process, the man dis-
tinguishes between stable and unstable ground.316 In so doing, he creates 
a system of orientation without being able to evaluate the world in its 
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entire complexity.317 Lawyers act in a similar fashion when they merely 
ask about the legality or illegality of actions or conditions. In this con-
text, they need standards that allow them to make clear binary distinc-
tions. The stricter the legal standards are, the higher the determinacy of 
the legal norms. Against this background, the principle of democratic 
teleology fails to meet the standards most legal scholars favor. Whether a 
State has held elections or not is a question of fact that can be answered 
quite easily.318 In contrast, whether a government acts in the interests of 
its population requires difficult normative evaluations. 
Nonetheless, strict normative standards do not always take into account 
the complexity of reality. Martti Koskenniemi has argued that the “inde-
terminacy” of norms is inherent to international legal principles.319 Ac-
cording to Koskenniemi, absolute legal standards are always over- or 
under-inclusive.320 International law thus suffers from an inherent tension 
between determinacy and justice. The more determinate the legal stan-
dards are, the less apt they are to take into account the complexity of  
reality. Alternatively the more they adjust to complexity, the less deter-
minate they are. In particular, as the effectiveness of international law 
depends upon its level of acceptance in the international community, in-
ternational law cannot afford to impose strict standards. It must apply to 
circumstances and strategies as diverse as global democratization itself. 
Francis Fukuyama’s diagnosis of “the end of history”321 is premature. 
Democracy still has a long way to go, and this is reflected by the present 
state of international law. In the legal debate of the 1990s, even those 
authors who favored democratic entitlement did not claim the existence 
of an unconditional right to democratic governance.322 Instead, most of 
them identified a democratic trend,323 or most famously, an “emerging 
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right to democratic governance.”324 As the present Article has argued, 
this position should be reformulated: international law contains a prin-
ciple of democratic teleology, namely, a right to the emergence of demo-
cratic governance. 
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